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CEMENT NAT'L BANK v. DEP'T OF BANKING:
PENNSYLVANIA BANKING ACT CONSTRUED
TO NOT REQUIRE HEARINGS ON

BRANCH BANK APPROVALS
In Cement Nat'l Bank v. Dep't of Banking,' the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania construed the revised Pennsylvania banking code'
as it pertains to applications for branch banks. On the grounds
that the nature of the decision was "non-judicial," it decided
that the Department of Banking may refuse to hold hearings on
branch bank approval and may refuse to disclose the reasons for
its decision.3 The court supported the Department of Banking's
refusal to allow a protesting bank to discover or controvert the
evidence by which an applicant offered to prove the need for a
branch bank.
4
After examining Pennsylvania law on branch bank approval,
this Note will analyze the Cement Nat'l Bank reasoning. in light of
prior banking practices and the legal standing of competitor banks
on judicial review following an administrative approval of a branch
bank application. The scope of this Note is limited to a determination of whether the revised approval procedures as interpreted by
the Cement Nat'l Bank court substantively denied statutory and
constitutional rights of the protesting banks.
Tri-County State Bank, with principal offices in Carbon County, filed an application with the Department of Banking in accordance with the requirements of the revised banking code and sought
authority to establish an initial branch in contiguous Northampton
County. Cement National Bank and Merchants National Bank of
Allentown notified the Department of their opposition to the establishment of the branch. An examiner for the Department of
Banking conducted an investigation to determine the need for a
1. 425 Pa. 554, 230 A.2d 209 (1967).
2. Banking Code of 1965, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 101-2204 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Banking Code of 1965].
3. 425 Pa. at 564, 230 A.2d at 215.
4. This Note will be concerned primarily with the procedure on
branch banking as it pertains to building of branch offices by banks, as
opposed to mergers which leave one bank as the branch of another or to
bank chartering or to amendments to articles of incorporation for the purpose of relocation. No attempt will be made to use a different term from
that used in the statute or by the court such as de novo branching, a term
used by some authors to distinguish the situation herein discussed. See
Phillips, Bank Mergers, Branch Banking and Bank Holding Companies in
Pennsylvania, 115 PA. L. REv. 560, 561 (1961); Shull and Horwitz, Branch

Banking and the Structure of Competition, 1
301 (1964).
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branch at the proposed location. During his two-day investigation,
the examiner interviewed officers of the-opposing banks and gave
them an opportunity to state their reasons for opposing the branch.
The banks requested copies of Tri-County's application and its
supporting information; they also requested a hearing. The
Department denied both requests.5 The banks filed official
letters of protest along with detailed supporting documentary material. Fifty-eight days following the date of filing, the Department of Banking, in accord with the report of the examiner which
recommended favorable action, approved Tri-County's application
and issued a letter' authorizing the Northampton branch. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the protesting banks a petition for allowance of appeal by certiorari."
The protesting banks contended that the Northampton branch
approval was contrary to the intent of the legislature since the
Department of Banking changed the approval procedure from
adversary to ex parte. This arbitrary action, the banks argued,
was an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due
process of law. The supreme court disagreed. It supported the
Department's claim that the procedure they followed was in accordance with section 905 of the Banking Code as revised. 7 It reasoned that the procedure the Department followed was not a denial of due process because the agency's action did not affect property rights. The court, therefore, in a four to three decision with
one justice concurring in the result, affirmed the Department's approval of the branch without granting the protesting banks an administrative hearing.8
5. Record at 58a-59a, 149a, 150a, Cement Nat'l Bank v. Dep't of Bank-

ing, 425 Pa. 554, 230 A.2d 209 (1967).
6. 425 Pa. at 566, 230 A.2d at 211. In Pennsylvania the Act of May 22,
1722, 3 STAT. AT LARGE OF PA. 298, 303 (1896), conferred upon the supreme
court the exclusive power to issue certiorari to review decisions of boards
or commissions created by statute in order to keep them within their
proper jurisdiction. Both the Superior Courts and the courts of common pleas are precluded from issuing the writ to such bodies. Bells Appeal, 396 Pa. 592, 152 A.2d 731 (1959); Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v.
Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948); For a fuller treatment see, Reader,
Judicial Review of "Final" Administrative Decisions in Pennsylvania, 67
DICK L. REV. 2, 3 (1962).
7. Banking Code of 1965, § 905; Brief for Appellees at 15, Cement
Nat'l Bank v. Dep't of Banking, 425 Pa. 554, 230 A.2d 209 (1967).
8. The indiscriminate use of the term "hearing" is not conducive to
a proper framing of the issues in this case. The form of an administrative
hearing depends on the particular purposes for which the hearing is being
held. It may be a formal trial-type adversary hearing with the safeguards
such procedures give. At the other extreme an administrative hearing may
be an informal, ex parte gathering of information much like a legislature
would hold. One authority in the field would, in the case of branch banking, urge a middle ground. This is the informal conference at which the
opposing parties would be present to hear and present evidence. 1 K.
DAVIs, ADmINISTRATVE LAW TREATISE, § 4.04 (1958) [hereinafter cited as

K. DAVIS].

Procedural formality, constitutionally necessary in some in-
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The Cement Nat'l Bank decision is a substantial departure
from that which obtained heretofore. However, a proper evaluation of the implications of this decision first requires a brief discussion of prior approval procedures.
BANKING CODES:

1933 AND 1965

The first major codification of statutory regulation of branch
banking in Pennsylvania occurred with the enactment of the Banking Code of 1933. 9 Perhaps in reaction to the thousands of bank
failures between 1920 and 1933, which were generally attributed
to weak or under-capitalized banks in population centers unable to
support them, the legislature initially placed strict restraints on
bank entry. In branch banking, in particular, geographic limitations which restricted branching to corporate limits of the city,
town, or borough in which the applicant had its central office
gave the regulatory agencies no discretion.' 0 Then in 1935 the
legislature permitted the agencies some slight discretion when it
stances, may be wholly unsuited to banking situations because of the
uniqueness of a bank in the commercial community and the impossibility of
preserving credit during an investigation. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1947); accord, First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 275
(4th Cir. 1965) (dissenting opinion, Soboloff, J.). Because of the nature of
banking, Professor Davis encourages the use of the conference method as
being superior to trial-type hearing. If such a conference type hearing is
used, instead of the trial-type, the safeguards of the latter procedure are
absent. There is but slight protection against arbitrary exercises of administrative discretion. The one safeguard which is available is the gossamer one of fairness. Fairness dictates that each party is entitled to
know and have the opportunity to controvert the allegation of the other
side. K. DAVIS, § 4.04 at 83 (Supp. 1965); see Bank of Haw River v. Saxon,
257 F. Supp. 74 (M.D.N.C. 1966) (An investigation conducted by the Comptroller was wholly unilateral. No information was offered in support of
the application, witnesses at the so-called hearing were told they need not
be sworn and were not subject to cross-examination. The court noted that
the entire procedure fell far short of affording plaintiff a hearing. A hearing means, said the court, that every party shall have the right to present
his case by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence,
and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and
true disclosure of the facts). An adversary hearing, however, which was
denied to Cement National Bank is also denied in a number of federal cases.
See, First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965);
Warren Bank v. Saxon, 263 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Mich. 1966); Farris v. Indian
Hills Nat'l Bank, 244 F. Supp. 594 (C.D. Neb. 1964).
9. Banking Code of 1933, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 (Appendix) § 819-1
to § 819-1602 (1967) [hereinafter cited Banking Code of 1933]. Section
2204 of the Banking Code of 1965 provides:
Transition provisions. (a) Transactions and proceedings commenced under or pursuant to statutes repealed by this act shall be
terminated, completed or enforced pursuant to the provisions of
such statutes which for such purposes shall remain in full force
and effect as to such transactions and proceedings.
Banking Code of 1965, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 2204 (1967).
10. Act of May 15, 1933, P.L. 624, Art. 11, § 204 [1933] (repealed
1955).
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enlarged the geographic limitations to permit branching in the
county or county contiguous to the central office. A factual standard was inserted which required the agency to find that the community of the proposed branch was "without banking facilities"
and that the presence of another bank would not be "injurious to
the community."1 1 Later, an amendment relaxed the standard to
permit greater discretion so that approval would issue if the community to be served by the proposed branch was without "adequate" banking facilities. 12 Finally, the legislature modified the
could establish that a
standard to permit approval if the applicant
"need" existed at the location designated. 3 The tone of the procedure, however, remained restrictive compared to the freedom of
the pre-code era. Even with the relaxation of the factual standards which permitted greater regulatory discretion, the 1933 Code
as modified still required the applicant to meet 14specific geographic,
capital and notice requirements before approval.
The 1933 Code also required that two different agencies pass
on the application for a branch bank: the Department of Banking
and the Banking Board.' 5 The Department, through a bank examiner, investigated the claims set forth in the application to see
if a "need" existed at the proposed location. By its sole discretion the Department could disapprove an application; 16 but if approval resulted, the Code required the Department to forward the
application to the Banking Board' 7 whose decision was binding on
11. Act of July 2, 1935, P.L. 507, § 1 [1935] (repealed 1955).
12. Act of April 22, 1937, P.L. 349, § 1 [1937] (repealed 1955).
13. Act of December 30, 1955, P.L. 920 § 3 [1955] (portions of this
act are still effective, see note 8 supra).
14. Banking Code of 1933 at § 819-204.1. The geographic restrictions
and "need" restrictions on branch banking by this act placed Pennsylvania
among those states which have "limited" branching as opposed to those
having statewide branching or unit banking. This classification is that
used by the Federal Reserve. For a critical analysis of the present Pennsylvania restrictions which are seen to rebound to the disadvantage of the
public due to control of competition, see Phillips, supra note 4, see also
Comment, Bank Charter,Branching, Holding Company and Merger Laws:
Competition Frustrated,71 YALE L.J. 502 (1962); Shull and Horwitz, supra
at 341.
15. Banking Code of 1933 at § 819-204.1.
16. Id. at § 819-204.1. Disagreements often arose over what constituted the "community to be served." See Upper Darby Nat'l Bank v.
Myers, 386 Pa. 12, 19, 124 A.2d 116, 118 (1957) (A community within the
meaning of the Banking Code is not necessarily limited by municipal lines
and boundaries, but may denote an area having common residential, social,
business, commercial or industrial interests). Cf. Western Pa. Nat'l Bank v.
Myers, 407 Pa. 298, 305-06, 180 A.2d 423, 426-27 (1962). Other disagreements arose over what was adequate: Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers,
401 Pa. 230, 164 A.2d 86 (1960); Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y v. Banking
Bd., 383 Pa. 253, 118 A.2d 501 (1955). Other factual disagreements arose
over what the "need" requirement referred to: Western Pa. Nat'l Bank v.
Myers, 407 Pa. 298, 180 A.2d 423 (1962); Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y v.
Myers, 406 Pa. 438, 179 A.2d 209 (1962).
17. Banking Code of 1933 at § 819-204.1.
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the Department. 8 Although the code declared the Department's
and the Board's decisions "final," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reviewed such determinations by a grant of certiorari. 19
In 1965 the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a new banking
code. With a few exceptions, this code was a comprehensive revision of Pennsylvania banking law. One result is that procedures
regarding branch banking now are in a single section, in a more
simplified easier-to-read format. 20 The drafters intended no
changes in the substantive rights of protesting or applicant banks
in the branch banking chapter. The comments 2' of the Commission state that:
In undertaking its task to recommend revisions of the
18. First Belefonte Bank Trust Co. v. Myers, 410 Pa. 298, 188 A.2d 726
(1963).
19. Blairsville Nat'l Bank v. Myers, 409 Pa. 526, 187 A.2d 655 (1963),
Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, 401 Pa. 230, 164 A.2d 86 (1960);
Cumberland Valley Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Myers, 396 Pa. 331, 153 A.2d 466
(1959); Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y v. Banking Bd., 383 Pa. 244, 118 A.2d
57 (1955); Delaware County Nat'l 'Bank v. Myers,.378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d 416
(1954).
20. Banking Code of 1965 at § 905 provides, in part: Approval of
Branch by Department
(a) Investigation and discretionary hearings-Upon receipt of an
application for approval of a branch which satisfies the requirements of this act, the department shall conduct such investigation as it may deem necessary and, in its discretion,
may hold hearings before the department or before the Bank-

(b)

ing Board.
Discretion to disapprove in certain cases-The Department
may, in its discretion, disapprove an application by an incorporated institution if the county in which the principal
place of business of the institution is located and if an incorporated institution which has its principal place of business
in the county in which the proposed branch would be located
has in good faith notified the department of its intention to
establish a branch in the same city, incorporated town, bor-

ough or township in which the proposed branch would be
located.

Action by Department-Within sixty days after receipt of the
application or such longer period as may be required for any
hearing which the department may hold, the department
shall, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section approve the application if it finds that there is a need for banking services or facilities such as are contemplated by the establishment of the proposed branch and that the requirements of this act have been complied with but shall otherwise disapprove the application. If the department approves
the application, it shall issue to the institution a letter of authority to establish the branch. If the department disapproves
the application, it shall give the institution written notice of
its disapproval and a statement in detail of the reasons for the
decision. The decision of the department shall be final and
shall not be subject to review except by the Supreme Court
upon broad certiorari.
(Subsections (d) Time for establishment of branch; (e) Discontinuance
of branch; and (f) Record of branches are not reproduced).
21. The comments to the section were expressly adopted as guides
for the construction and application of the new code. Banking Code of
1965 at § 104(a).
(c)
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Banking Code and the Department of Banking Code [71
P. S. § 733-1 to 733-1203], the Commission which drafted
this act reached the conclusion that it could not be in a
position to make any responsible recommendation concerning the questions of branches and holding companies at
the time when it would be prepared to recommend the
adoption of this act. It decided that before it could form
a conclusion whether the present Pennsylvania law governing branches and holding companies should be retained or
whether some change would be advisable, it would have to
have as a factual basis for its conclusion both studies by
economic experts and also the considered practical judgments of the bankers in Pennsylvania concerning the
operation and effect of the current law and the need for
change, if any.
At the time of publication of the proposed act, economists had been retained to begin the necessary background
studies and it was expected that their report would be submitted to the Commission in the last spring of 1965. Accordingly, in recommending this act in the late fall of 1964,
the Commission retained in this chapter the same substantive provisions concerning branches as those of the prior
Code. The provisions are restated and rearranged to correspond with the format and language of the remainder
of this act with only 22
the minor changes noted in the comments of this chapter.

The revised Code provisions still require that a bank establish a
branch only in the county or the county contiguous to the county of
the main office, 23 meet minimum capital requirements 24 and give
written notice to all other banking institutions in the county of
the proposed branch.2 5
The Banking Code did make one important "procedural" change
however. The Banking Board was eliminated from the procedure
on branch bank approval. 26 Under the prior law, a state bank
usually waited six months to obtain a branch bank approval. A
national bank, on the other hand, could obtain approval in a matter of two months or less. This difference led to what amounted
to a "race" for branch banks between national and state banks.
The Banking Law Commission noted that in Pennsylvania
in a number of situations while a state institution was
waiting approval, a national bank applied for and obtained
approval of a competing branch during the waiting period.
22. Id. at § 901 (Comment-Banking Law Commission) (emphasis
added).
23.
24.

Banking Code of 1965 at § 905(b).
Id. at § 904(a) ii.

25. Id. at § 904(a) iii.

26. Id. at § 901. Under the Act, the department may consult the
Board on branch application but it is no longer required to forward fot
review an application it has approved.
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Recently, the then third largest state institution converted to a national bank. An important, if not the most
important reason for its action was the problem of delays
in obtaining approvals of new branches. This development
underscored the serious threat to the continuance of Pennsylvania institutions as part of the dual banking system
which was posed by the delays in branch applications resulting from the requirement of board approval. The only
is to elimiway to avoid this undesirable consequence
27
nate board action as a requirement.
The Department of Banking now has sole discretion in determining whether there exists a "need" for a new branch in the proposed location. With the Banking Board eliminated from the approval procedure, unless construction of the revised Code provides
for procedural safeguards it is possible that the substantive rights
of a protesting bank will have been changed through the elimination of the need for Board approval. Such a result would be counter to the clear intention of the draftsmen not to make substantive
changes in branch bank approval procedure.
CEMENT NAT'L BANK CONSTRUED LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Cement Nat'l Bank was the first case in which a court construed the branch bank approval procedure as it now exists in
Pennsylvania. The court initially found the intent of the legislature expressed in the language of section 905(a) which provides
that on an approval of a branch bank application the department
"... in its discretion may hold hearings before the department or
before the Banking Board." Chief Justice Bell, writing the majority opinion, found no statutory requirement in this language
that a hearing must be provided. The Banking Law Commission
comment to section 902(a) explains that this section ".

.

. does not

require hearings in connection with branch bank applications but
its discretion either bepermits the department to hold hearings in
' 28
fore the department or the Banking Board.
Cement National Bank contended that the only discretion which
the department has is whether to hold a hearing before the Department or before the Banking Board. The court concluded this
contention was devoid of merit. It reasoned that the Department
of Banking and the legislature have recognized the delicate and
sensitive nature of banking, and of banking information possessed
by the Department of Banking which, in certain instances, should
remain confidential. Otherwise, divulgence of such information
might result in disastrous effects on all banks in that banking
community.
The majority's reasoning appears novel, however, in light of
27.

Id. at § 2005 (comment-Banking Law Commission).

28. Id. at § 905 (a) (comment-Banking Law Commission).
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prior practices of both the Department of Banking and the Banking
Board under the 1933 Code. Before the Code's revision both the
Department of Banking and the Banking Board held hearings as a
matter of course when new or substantially different banking facilities would result from official action: on mergers in which one
of the merging parties became a branch of the other bank, 29 on
amendments to articles of incorporation to establish a new branch, 0
as well as on applications for new branches.8 ' At some stage of the
branch banking procedure either the Department or the Board
held hearings. At such hearings, the opposing party obtained information supplied by the applicant, a practice which the majority
in Cement Nat'l Bank would have found precluded hearings.32
The court also discerned the legislative intent in the provisions
of two statutes regarding administrative agency regulation of
branch banking. Thus, it felt that article III, section 302 of the
Department of Banking regulations precluded hearings. This section provides that the divulgence of information by the Secretary
or any officer or employee of the Department of Banking is a
misdemeanor.83
Under the Banking Code of 1933, however, hearings were the
rule rather than the exception. In no case prior to Cement Nat'l
Bank had a court found the provisions of the regulations to be
such as to deny the protesting bank an opportunity to discover the
evidence offered by the applicant in support of its claim. Furthermore, the purpose of this section is to prohibit voluntary disclosures, but does not seem intended to defeat the production of
necessary records in judicial proceedings.3 4 An exception to the
29. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, 388 Pa. 444, 130 A.2d 686
(1957); Delaware County Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d
416 (1954).
30. Blairsville Nat'l Bank v. Myers, 409 Pa. 526, 187 A.2d 655 (1963);
Western Nat'l Bank v. Myers, 407 Pa. 298, 180 A.2d 423 (1962); Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y v. Banking Bd., 383 Pa. 253, 118 A.2d 561 (1955).
31. Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y v. Myers, 406 Pa. 438, 179 A.2d 209
(1962) ; Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, 401 Pa. 230, 164 A.2d 86 (1960).
32. This point is particularly disturbing to the dissent. See Cement
Nat'l Bank v. Dep't of Banking, 425 Pa. 554, 570, 230 A.2d 209, 218 (1967)
(dissenting opinion, Roberts, J.).
33. Department of Banking Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 733-302
(1962). This section provides, in part:
Neither the secretary, nor any deputy, examiner, clerk, or other
employee of the department, shall publish or divulge to anyone any
information contained in or ascertained from any examination or
investigation made by the department .

.

. or any other paper or

document in the custody of the department, except when ...
divulgement of such information is made by the department pursuant to the provisions of this act or of any other law of this
Commonwealth....

[iS]uch violation shall be .

.

. a misdemeanor ....

34. Commonwealth v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 360 Pa. 103, 61
A.2d 430 (1948).
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section provides that information may be divulged "when the publication or divulgement of such is made pursuant to the provisions
of this act or any other law of the Commonwealth."' 5 It would
seem due process required that one of the exceptions intended by
the "unless" clause was branch bank applications.
The court also found support for its holding in Pennsylvania
administrative procedure. Section 51 of the Administrative Agency Law3 6 lists those agencies to which the requirements for notice
and hearing apply. The Department of Banking is absent from
this list. This absence, the court felt, indicated that the legislature did not intend that notice and hearing apply to the Department.
Rather than support the court's conclusion, however, section
51 more likely sustains the opposite inference that in such cases
the legislature intended the safeguards of the statute to apply.
While it is true that the section excluded the Department of Banking, it included the Banking Board. With the Banking Board eliminated from the procedure for approval of branch banks, it would
seem that its former function must now be performed by the only
other agency concerned, the Department of Banking. An analysis
of the function performed by the Banking Board under the 1933
Code procedure conflicts with the court's conclusion.
The Banking Board's major function under the prior Code
was to review the decisions of the Department of Banking on
branch bank approvals.3 7 Of those situations which would lead
to new banking institutions coming into existence under the prior
Code, only approvals of branch banks by the Department of Banking required Board review. The Code did not require that applications for mergers, for example, which resulted in branch banks
remaining after the merger, be forwarded to the Banking Board;
the Department in its sole discretion either approved or disapproved such applications. 38 Further, the Code required that applications for new bank charters 9 and approvals of amendments to
articles of incorporation, 40 after Department action, be forwarded,
not to the Banking Board for review, but to the Department of
State which department was included in section 51. This indicates
35. Department of Banking Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 733-302
(1962). See Cement Nat'l Bank v. Dept. of Banking, 425 Pa. 554, 570, 230
A.2d 209, 218 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
36. Administrative Agency Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.51
(1962).
37. Banking Code of 1965 at § 2005 (comment-Banking Law Commission). The Board was characterized as being composed of "experienced
able bankers who should know, if anyone knows, the banking needs of the
various communities in Pennsylvania." Delaware County Nat'l Bank v.
Myers, 378 Pa. 311, 315, 106 A.2d 416, 418 (1954).
38. Banking Code of 1933 at § 819-1406.
39. Id. at § 819-306.
40. Id. at § 819-808.
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that the Banking Board's main function was to act as a control on
administrative discretion in an approval of a branch bank. Moreover, when a competing bank protested the application for a new
branch under the prior Code, the Banking Board resolved the controversy by a determination of "need" for a new branch. The
notice and hearing provisions of the Administrative Agency Law
placed proper safeguards on its discretion. Now, however, in the
revised Code the Banking Board is eliminated from the approval
procedure. The control which it previously exercised over discretion must now be provided by the Department.
Therefore, the court's conclusions concerning the legislature's
intent seems ill-founded in the light of these two facts: (i) under
the 1933 Code, article III, section 302 of the Department's regulations did not restrict information from being divulged; and (ii)
section 51 of the Administrative Agency Law listed the Banking
Board among those agencies governed by the administrative procedural safeguards. Neither statute clearly supports the majority's conclusion. The court's construction of these two statutory
provisions to deny the competitor bank an opportunity for an administrative hearing can hardly be justified.
One further negation for the court's conclusion concerning the
legislature's intent is the notice requirement the new Code has.
A requirement for notice is often found to be complementary to a
hearing requirement. Section 904(b)iii, inter alia, provides that
the applicant bank must give ". .

written notice of the filing of

the application for the approval of the branch to each other institution whose principal place of business is located in the county
of the location of the proposed branch ....,,41This provision
runs counter to the majority's view that hearings are not required because of the delicate and sensitive nature of banking.
Notice is required, presumably, so that other affected banks will
be aware of an impending entry into their banking community.
It gives to the affected banks an opportunity to present an official
protest with substantiating data rebutting the applicant's claim.
The hollowness of this statutory right becomes obvious, however, where there would be no opportunity to see the data of the
applicant prior to the approval. Without a hearing and an opportunity to see the allegations in the application as to "need," the
protesting bank would be in no position to rebut the evidence presented. Whatever legal interests the affected banks may have, by
the court's construction of section 905(a) obviating a hearing requirement at the Department level, a protesting bank's interests
are left without an important procedural safeguard against arbitrary administrative action. Where a statutory provision gives the
affected protesting banks a right to notice, the reasonable inference is that the legislature intended that a competitor bank know
41. Banking Code of 1965 at § 904(b) iii.
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of the claims of the applicant. Therefore, the opportunity should
also be available for the opposing bank to controvert such evidence should it be erroneous.
PROCEDURAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Whether a hearing was required at the administrative level
under the language of the revised Code in Cement Nat'l Bank depended on two interrelated issues: first, whether the actions of the
Department of Banking when passing on branch bank approval
were "adjudicative" so as to give the protesting bank a statutory
right to a hearing, and second, assuming arguendo, no statutory
compunction, whether the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section
9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution commanded that certain limitations be placed on official discretion.
Statutory Administrative ProceduralRequirements
The trend in the courts has been to construe statutory provisions relative to administrative approval of branch bank applications so as to permit protesting banks to be "interested," "aggrieved," or "substantially affected" parties involved in an "adjudication" or "contested case. '42 The importance of so construing the nature of such an administrative decision is procedurally crucial. It is only with respect to administrative proceedings included within the definition of "adjudication" that parties
may claim as a matter of statutory right the procedural safeguards of adequate notice, fair hearing, and a decision based on
a written record in which the48 parties have the opportunity to present and controvert evidence.
In the federal banking system the Comptroller of the Currency approves branch bank applications submitted by existing
national banks."4 Although federal courts have recently held that
42. Newport Nat'l Bank v. Providence Institution For Say., 226 A.2d
137 (1967) (proceedings of board under statute were 'contested cases');
see Hall v. Banking Review Bd., 13 Wis. 2d 359, 108 N.W.2d 543 (1961)
(grant of authority to open a bank deemed a contested case for purpose
of determining the applicability of the prescribed procedural requirements); cf. Elizabeth Federal S. & L. Ass'n v. Howell, 24 N.J. 488, 132 A.2d
779 (1957) (granting permission to establish branch office a bank was 'a
party in interest' with the statute); contra, Peoples Bank of Van Leer v.
Bryan, 397 S.W.2d 401 (Court of Appeals, Tenn. 1965); Natick Trust Co. v.
Board of Bank Incorporators, 337 Mass. 615, 151 N.E.2d 70 (1958).
43. 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADMINIsTRATrIV LAW 124 (1965) [hereinafter
cited F. CooPER].
44. National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(c) (1) and (2) provides:
(c)
A national banking association may, with the approval of the
Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new
branches: (1) within the limits of the city, town, or village in
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'this official is not required to hold administrative hearings on
such applications, these same courts have construed the nature
of the Comptroller's decision to be "adjudicative. ' 45 First Nat'l
Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon 46 illustrates the resulting procedure.
In Smithfield a state bank contended the applicable provisions of
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 47 and due process required the Comptroller to conduct an adversary hearing. A district court sustained this contention but was reversed by the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The court said:
Assuming that the Comptroller is an 'agency,' that the
approval by the Comptroller is a 'license' and that the consideration by him of the application is an 'adjudication,' all
within the meaning of § 1001, still no requirement is
found in the APA of the hearing now claimed by the Bank
of Smithfield. The provision on which appellee relies is
§ 1004, but that section compels an agency hearing only
when the 'adjudication [is] required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for48 an agency hearing,' and there is no such compulsion here.
In this and similar cases, however, the federal courts were agreed
that in such a procedure even though the National Banking Act 49
did not so require, due process required that the competing banks
which said association is situated, if such establishment and

operation are at the same time expressly authorized to State
banks by the law of the State in question; and (2) at any
point within the State in which said association is situated, if
such establishment and operation are at the same time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State in
question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and
subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by law of
the State on the banks.
The effect and purpose of the section was to insure equality between
state and national banks regarding the establishment of branches. See
First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966).
By reason of the incorporation of state law in Section 36 (c), it would seem
that the Comptroller must follow state law in approving branches of
national banks. In determining whether the Comptroller has correctly
construed state law, the courts have generally followed the construction
which the states have given their own law. Where the application of state
law has involved a finding of fact, the Comptroller's finding of fact has
been sustained unless found to be arbitrary or capricious. Bell, National
Bank Branches-The Authority to Approve and Challenge, 82 B.L.J. 1
(1965).
45. The more significant among the numerous cases are: American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 373 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1967); Webster Groves
Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966); First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965); Warren Bank v. Saxon, 263
F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Mich. 1966); but see, First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank,
385 U.S. 254 (1966).
46. 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965).
47. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 (1967), amending
5 U.S.C. §§ 1.009(a) (1946) [hereinafter called APA].
48.. 352 F.2d at 269.
49. National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-1899 (1967).
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be given a fair opportunity to be heard on a question of fact.
Indeed, the thrust of these opinions is that due process must be
satisfied at some point in the proceedings. Smithfield reasoned
that section 702 of the APA, which gives the protesting banks an
express right to judicial review, satisfied the requirements of due
process. 50
In local jurisdictions which do not have statutory requirements
for notice and hearing, state courts have similarly found a constitutional requirement for notice and hearing prior to final admuinistrative approval of a branch bank. Such courts find this requirement either: (1) because of a statutory interest in the protesting bank; or (2) a property right by which due process guarantees protection from potential official arbitrariness or unlawful
procedure. The distinct trend is to construe statutory language
broadly to afford protection to a protesting bank. Cement Nat'l
Bank does not reflect this trend. It is evident that the genuine
concern a bank has as a member of a highly controlled industry,
and the adverse effects which over-banking will have on its operation were of little significance to the majority when it said that
".. . banks . . . are merely creatures of a Legislature or of Con-

gress, and have only such rights as are granted by Statute or by
Congressional Act, as the case may be."'
It cannot be disputed that in their construing of statutory
requirements courts, in a number of recent decisions, have denied a
protesting bank an administrative hearing.52 After affirming these
rulings, however, Cement Nat'l Bank held that a decision by the
Department of Banking was "nonjudicial" and did not "adjudicate" property rights. Furthermore, the majority concluded that
even if it were to assume that a right of judicial appeal was constitutionally required, the requirement was met as Pennsylvania provides a ".

.

. similar Appellate Court review as that provided for in

the federal system. . . .
This conclusion appears to be an
illusory answer. Not only would a court review without benefit
of stated reasons on the Department of Banking's findings of fact,
but the record on review would be based on purely ex parte evidence or no evidence at all, as the Secretary need give no reasons
for his decision. Thus, it would seem that a protesting bank,
which had no opportunity to see or to controvert the claims of the
applicant, could obtain no effective judicial review.
"5

50. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1967), amending
5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1946).
51. Cement Nat'l Bank v. Dep't of Banking, 425 Pa. 554, 562, 230 A.2d
209, 214 (1967).
52. First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir.
1965); Bank of Sussex County v. Saxon, 251 F. Supp. 132 (C.D.N.J. 1966);
Farris v. Indian Hills Nat'l Bank, 244 F. Supp. 594 (C.D. Neb. 1964); Peoples' Bank of Van Leer v. Bryan, 397 S.W.2d 401 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1965).
53. 425 Pa. at 564, 230 A.2d at 215.
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The nature of the Department's decision, the Cement Nat'l Bank
court also decided, was not one which required a hearing. This conclusion should be compared with the observation that most administrative decisions may be roughly divided into those that are ministerial and those that are adjudicative. The court quoted with approval Peoples Bank of Van Leer v. Bryan,14 where the Tennessee
court said: "The granting or withholding of permission to establish
a branch office of a bank is not a judicial function, but is purely an
administrative function."5 5 This would indicate that the court views
the Department's decision as "ministerial," and not "adjudicative."
The Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law 56 requires that there
be a hearing if the decision is adjudicative. It would appear that, by
construing the Department's decision to be "non-judicial," not affecting "property rights," this court denied the protesting banks a
statutory right to be heard.
Other jurisdictions have reached an opposite result. A Wisconsin court has held that a branch bank approval by a banking
board was, by nature, an administrative determination which required notice and hearing.57 In Newport Nat'l Bank v. Providence
Institute for Say.5 1 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that
an application by a bank before the Board of Bank Incorporators
was construed to be "licensing." Thus, the court found a statutory requirement for an agency hearing. In doing so, it chose to
reverse its case law. Prior to its Providence decision, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island decided Newport Nat'l Bank v. Hawksley. 59
It involved a petition for certiorari to review the decision of an
administrative board granting a certificate of approval to establish
a branch bank. In Hawksley, the court held that:
the nature of the act of issuing a certificate of public convenience and advantage of the establishment of a branch
office is purely legislative and that the nature of the proceedings of the board performing such act is administrative. Under the statute the board is an administrative
agency of the legislature endowed with delegated power.
54. 397 S.W.2d 401 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1965).
55. 425 Pa. at 560, 230 A.2d at 213.
56. Administrative Agency Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.2 (Supp.
1966) providing:
(a) "Adjudication" means any find order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by an agency affecting personal or
property rights, privileges, immunities or obligations of any or
all of the parties to the proceeding in which the adjudication
is made, but shall not mean any final order, decree, decision,
determination or ruling based upon a proceeding before a
court, or which involves the seizure or forfeiture of property, or which involves paroles, pardons, or releases from
mental institutions.
57. Hall v. Banking Review Bd., 13 Wisc. 2d 359, 108 N.W.2d 543
(1961).
58. 226 A.2d 137 (R.I. 1967), cert. granted, 233 A.2d 111 (1967).
59. 92 R.I. 433, 169 A.2d 616 (1961).
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The fact that a hearing is required

. . .

does not mean that

the board's action is necessarily judicial or quasi-judicial. 60
The court reasoned that under the provisions of its statute on
branch bank approval any finding of public convenience was a
matter of public policy for the administrative agency and did not
require the exercise of judicial discretion. Subsequent to Hawksley the Rhode Island legislature approved a new administrative
procedure statute which defined the term "contested case" to
mean
a proceeding, including but not restricted to rate-making,
price fixing, and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a specific party are required by law
to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for
hearing....

61

Pursuant to this statutory definition the Providence court construed the nature of the branch bank approval to be a "contested
case." It reasoned that
the legal rights, duties or privileges of a specific party
are required by law to be determined after public hearing ....

The definition of a contested case does not refer

to conflicting rights between adverse parties, but refers
to the determination of the legal rights, duties or privileges of a specific party. We find nothing in the language of the act which restricts its application to a determination of proceedings which are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. The language of the act is clear and there
is no ambiguity. These proceedings were contested cases.
The act is not a restatement of existing law and therefore we do not refer
back to previous case law to aid in
62
its determination.
Therefore, the Providence court found, in its administrative procedure statute, rights in the opposing bank. It reversed and remanded a lower court's grant to dismiss on the ground that the
proceedings before the board could not be construed as a "contested case." In doing so, it overruled Hawksley. It is submitted
that the Rhode Island procedure points to the future wherein the
better reasoned decisions will find a statutory right to a hearing.
ConstitutionalRequirements
In Cement Nat'l Bank the question as to a constitutional necessity for a hearing arose because the Department of Banking asserted its right to make ex parte determinations on the evidence
presented. There is no general test or formula which is available to decide when or even if prior to a decision by the Department
60.
61.

added).

92 R.I. 436, 169 A.2d at 618 (emphasis added).
Rhode Island Gen. Laws 1956, § 42-35-1 (Supp. 1967) (emphasis

62. 226 A.2d at 441.
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of Banking due process requires that an administrative hearing be
held.63 To be entitled to due process, a competitor bank must
have such an interest in the determination so as to have a legal
right.6 4 In an approval of a branch bank both the bank's and the
public's interests are involved. Therefore, it is necessary to strike
a balance between these sometimes conflicting interests. Private banks seek to protect shareholders. The interests of the public seek a properly regulated banking industry which protects shareholders but also depositors, creditors of the bank, and the public
generally. While it is not easy for a court to separate the principles involved in deciding whether due process requires a hearing,
certain determinative features of the decision are related and
overlapping: (1) the nature of the proceeding-whether it is deciding the interests of these parties or whether the agency is establishing policy; (2) the substantiality of the interests involved
-whether they are of the calibre of "property rights;"6 5 and (3)
the prior practices of the agency-whether in similar instances particular procedures had been habitually followed with fairnessare inter-related and overlapping. Each consideration should be
given its due in any decision concerning due process.
The interests which a bank seeks to protect through its protests are significant. A bank's primary motive for challenging the
decision of the Department of Banking is the possible loss in
business which the opening of a new branch bank would present.
The Cement Nat'l Bank court made much of the purpose for which
it felt the legislature established the Department of Banking and
the Banking Board:
The legislature . . . did not exclude or intend to exclude

competition between banks; it intended, inter alia, to
exclude such competition as would likely weaken or destroy some banks in an over-banked community and thus
weaken or injure the entire banking system, to the
detriment of depositors, creditors, stockholders and the
public alike.66
What the court fails to note, however, is the peculiar facts of
this competition.
Banks occupy a unique place in the commercial community.
There is a difference, for example, between the failure of a drug
store or a large department store and the failure of a bank in the
effect it would have on the rest of the community. If a corner
63. F. COOPEF, supra note 29 at 140.
64. See Delaware County Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d
416 (1954), where the court held that the bank was "directly and substantially affected" so as to have standing to appeal.
65. See 425 Pa. at 569, 230 A.2d at 218 (dissenting opinion), where
Justice Roberts quite emphatically found there was a property right in the
protesting bank.
66. Id. at 561, 230 A.2d at 213-214.
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druggist goes out of business because he can not operate as efficiently as another competing druggist, the effect probably
benefits its competitor on the other corner of the street. But, in
the case where a bank fails due to over-banking, the effect is
quite different:
If one or more banks fail in a community, "runs" may and
often do occur on other banks and the entire banking community will likely be shaken or destroyed to the injury of
creditors, stockholders and the banking world
depositors,
7
alike.1

Moreover, a salient feature of banking is that it is an example of
the regulation of an entire industry. By regulating and restricting the growth of all banks in accordance with statutory criteria,
the legislature, it would seem, has created in those banks which
would be adversely affected by an arbitrary determination a right
deserving fair treatment. Professor Davis emphasized that the
principles of fundamental fairness entitles the protesting bank to
know the evidence presented and considered on the other side;
this right is an empty one unless opportunity is provided to meet
that evidence 8
EQUITIES AND ANOMALIES

While Cement Nat'l Bank was the first to construe the rights
which a protesting competitor bank has on a branch bank approval, the Pennsylvania court has not been unaware of this
issue. In Blairsville Nat'l Bank v. Meyers,6 9 the court indicated the
path which it would follow if presented with the question. In
Blairsville a group of incorporators applied for and the Department of Banking granted them articles of incorporation for a bank.
While the court was not presented with the issue since a hearing
had been held, the court said: "Although not required by law to
do so, the Secretary of Banking wisely held hearings to consider
the application .

.

. and the objections and protests thereto."7 0

The fact that four years previously in the same community the
Department of Banking had disapproved an application for a branch
bank illustrated the dangers inherent in the absence of this safeguard. Since the 1933 Code did not require the Department of
Banking to make findings of fact or conclusions there was no way
of knowing what had changed in the intervening years. A record,
in which the opposing banks had participated, satisfied the court
that the evidence could have justified a decision either way. Unwilling to find a clear abuse of discretion, it felt, rather, the need
67. Delaware County Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d
416 (1954); see also Elizabeth Federal S. & L. Assn. v. Howells, 24 N.J.
488, 132 A.2d 779 (1957).
68. 1 K. DAvis, supra note 9, § 4.04 at 83 (Supp. 1965).
69. 409 Pa. 526, 187 A.2d at 655 (1963).
70. Id.at 528, 187 A.2d at 657.
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to rely on the expertise of the Department of Banking. Blairsville saw, however, the difficulty for a review of an administrative
agency decision without a complete record:
[W] e have no way of knowing or determining (a) whether
the 'trade area' selected by the appellant, or that selected
by the appellee, justifiably constitutes the 'neighborhood'
or 'surrounding country' as those words are used in the
statute; or (b) the reasons why the Secretary of Banking
disapproved an application for a branch bank in Blairsville in 1958-he may have had valid reasons which have
no pertinency to the present application; and (c) we cannot
know with any justifiable certainty which set of witnesses
are more accurate and worthy71 of belief as to both matters
of fact and matters of opinion.

An anomalous situation would exist, it would seem, where a
protesting bank to a branch bank application has standing to
appeal without standing to be heard initially by the administrative
agency. In Delaware Nat'l Bank v. Myers, 72 a protesting bank to
a proposed branch approval was given standing to contest the
agency's decision. In Delaware a national bank opposed a state
bank's application for a merger with a smaller bank which, if approved, would effectively leave the resultant branch office in competition with the protesting bank. In order for the bank to have
standing before the court it was necessary for the court to find
that the bank was a proper party to the litigation. After considering that a bank is not like a drug store and would be adversely
affected rather than aided by the failure in the community of
another banking institution, Delaware held:
[O]n the question, therefore, of who has standing to object,
the words 'without adequate banking facilities' provided
by both state and national banks and either, if directly and
73
substantially affected, has a standing or right to object.
Furthermore, the Cement Nat'l Bank court which granted the
protesting bank standing to appeal did so on a record where the Department made evidence and factual determinations ex parte. It is
71. Id. at 534, 187 A.2d at 659-60. The Blairsville case is distinguishable from Cement Nat'l Bank, however, since it was an application for
articles of incorporation-procedurally different under the applicable statutes. Also the Blairsville bank had a hearing after its protests and it
does not appear that the question of a denial of constitutional due process
was considered by the court.
72. 378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d 416 (1954).
73. Id. at 318, 106 A.2d at 420. It seems well settled that a protesting bank has standing to seek judicial review in Pennsylvania. See Cement
Nat'l Bank v. Department of Banking, 425 Pa. 554, 230 A.2d 209 (1967);
Delaware County Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d 416 (1954).
For federal cases, see Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381
(8th Cir. 1966); First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th
Cir. 1965); Community Nat'l Bank of Pontiac v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224 (6th
Cir. 1962).
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generally conceded that a right to appeal to be effective implies a
right to participate in the making of the record, especially when
there is a finding of fact. The majority's procedure, which did not
allow the protesting bank to participate74in the record, created a
practical problem for the court on review.
One solution was outlined by the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in Elizabeth Federal S. & L. Ass'n v. Howell.75 The Elizabeth
court resolved two issues: (1) a challenge to the protesting bank's
standing to seek judicial review and (2) an alleged denial of due
process due to the lack of protesting banks' opportunity for a hearing. The court found neither a constitutional nor a statutory
right in the protesting banks to a hearing; the banks were granted
standing only to judicial review. As the court explained, a protesting bank had standing as a competitor whose interests, coupled
with the interest of the public, was such as should be heard.
Thus, competitor bank, qua competitor, may be the only party
with sufficient interest to prevent official action contrary to law.76
In this grant of standing, however, the Elizabeth court refused
to recognize that such standing gave the bank a constitutional right
to a hearing, It reasoned that
a competitor may in the public interest attack the administrative action here involved. As such, a competitor
may urge the question whether the Commissioner's action
exceeded his power or constituted an arbitrary exercise of
it. The objecting institutions, however, urge they are entitled to notice of hearing and the status of a party to the
proceeding with the broader review which that status would
afford. There is no constitutional basis for this further
claim; 7 if it exists, it is only because of a statutory provision
for it.T

But the court found a practical problem presented:
The objecting institutions were not given full opportunity
to inquire into the essential facts of the petition made
by Colonial [the applicant bank]. The record indicates
that 'considerable information' was supplied to the
Department by Colonial ex parte and not disclosed by the
objectors. Furthermore, the proceedings indicate that the
Commissioner relied in his determinaton on factual material in the files of his department and developed specifically for the purpose of deciding the pending applica74. One further difficulty on review is where there is no requirement
of a findings of fact or the reasons therefore, as the Code now provides.
Banking Code of 1965, § 905(c). Without knowing of the facts on which

the Department relied in the record, how is it possible for the court to
decide there is no abuse of discretion nor error of law? See, e.g., 425 Pa.
at 569, 230 A.2d 218 (dissenting opinion); Blairsville Nat'l Bank v. Myers,
409 Pa. 526, 534, 197 A.2d 655 (1963).
75. 24 N.J. 488, 132 A.2d 779 (1957).
76. Id. at 494, 132 A.2d at 788.
77. Id. at 495, 132 A.2d at 789.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

tion of Colonial, without divulging the substance of his
material and giving the objectors the opportunity to explore it.
The determination of the Commissioner cannot be
made to rest upon information outside the record in the
case before him which the parties have not had the opportunity to meet.
Beyond question the use of expert knowledge gained by
the Department is a desirable attribute of the administrative process, but it need not be applied in a manner which
is unfair. By taking appropriate official notice of such
material and making such facts part of the record and
giving the parties fair opportunity to meet, explain or
can adequately protect the
refute it, the Commissioner
8
interests of all concerned.7
In a somewhat unique twist, since it had found neither a statutory
requirement for a hearing nor a constitutional basis for the claim,
the court concluded:
Judicial review of the substantive propriety of the
Commissioner's determination should only be undertaken
on a complete record ....

Since the objectors were de-

nied appropriate contact with the record, fairness dictates
that they be given that opportunity.
In the interests of justice, therefore, the cause will be returned to the Commissioner for completion of the record
as the Comand such further findings and determination
79
missioner may make. Remanded.
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW:

BROAD CERTIORARI

It is evident from the language in Cement Nat'l Bank, as noted
above, that the court relied mainly on its conclusion that the decision of the Department of Banking was "non-judicial." This conclusion is unfortunate. In the early cases and texts,80 the functional
test was considered the true indicator of whether an administrative decision was judicial or legislative. The difficulties with applying this supposed test, however, belie its actual value. In cases
such as this, labeling serves more to mislead than as a guide to
decision. A decision of the Department of Banking on a branch
bank application involves mixed functions. If such categorizing
is to be used, it should be used only when some practical question
-for example, whether certiorari will lie-hinges on the answer.
Even then the classification should be affixed with an eye toward
producing a fair result in the particular case. 8'
78. Id. at 495-96, 132 A.2d at 789-90.
79.

80.

Id. at 497, 132 A.2d at 791 (emphasis added).

1 F. CooPER, supra note 43 at 142.

81. Reader, Judicial Review of "Final" Administrative Decisions in
Pennsylvania,67 DICK. L. REV. 2, 3 (1962).
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The Pennsylvania court's grant of standing to judicial review
by way of certiorari illustrates the problem of accurately classifying the decisions of the Department of Banking as either judicial
or non-judicial. Section 905(c) provides, inter alia, that ".
[t]he decision of the department shall be final and shall not be
subject to review except by the Supreme Court upon broad certiorari. '8 2 The rule pertaining to certiorari as it applies to administrative agencies in Pennsylvania was set forth in Newport Township School Dist. v. State Tax Equalization Bd.83 The Supreme
Court explained that
[t] he writ lies only to inferior tribunals and officers exercising judicial functions and the act to be reviewed must
be judicial in its nature, not ministerial or legislative.
Though the tribunal need not be technically judicial or constitute a court of justice in the ordinary sense, if they are
invested by the legislature with the power to decide on
property rights of others they are acting judicially in
decision whatever may be their public
making their
84
character.
Applying this rule to the Banking Department, Delaware Nat'l
Bank v. Myers8 5 distinguished the appeal of a protesting bank by
way of certiorari from an appeal that was "non-judicial." When
the applicant bank moved to dismiss on the grounds that the decision was "non-judicial," the court quashed the motion. Instead,
the supreme court, by certiorari, reviewed the Department of Banking action. Did this mean the decision of the Department of Banking was "judicial" in nature and did affect substantial property
rights?
In Cement Nat'l Bank the court said the Department of Banking's decision was non-judicial; that it did not affect the protesting
bank's property rights; and that due process did not compel an
administrative hearing. The court, nevertheless, obtained jurisdiction by certiorari from the Department of Banking decision under
the language of 905(c). While no question was raised on appeal
as to its jurisdiction the court interpreted the provision in that
section to mean that an appeal would lie to the court under Rule
68 Y2.8 The problem presented is inescapable: if the decision by
82. Banking Code of 1965, § 905(c).
83. 366 Pa. 603, 79 A.2d 641 (1951).
84. Id. at 611, 79 A.2d at 644 (emphasis added).
85. 378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d 416 (1954). See discussion p. 500 supra.
of the Rules of the
86. 425 Pa. at 557, 230 A.2d at 211. Rule 68
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania provides, in part:
Where the subject matter does not fall within the statutory jurisdiction of the Superior Court, an appeal to the Supreme Court in
the nature of a certiorari from a judgment order or decree will lie
only if specially allowed by the Court or by a Judge thereof,
where a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal
from the decision or order or judgment or decree of a court, or that
the decision or order or judgment or decree of a court shall be
final or conclusive, or shall not be subject to review, or where the
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the Department was "non-judicial" then by reviewing by certiorari,
sion; if the decision was judicial, then due process required a
the court was exceeding its powers to review a legislative decihearing.
The court was not unaware of its dilemma. Posing hypothetically that a bank's constitutional rights were involved, the
court analogized the broad certiorari appeal allowed under Section
905(c) to the appeal under the federal system. As the dissent
saw, however,
[t] he scope of judicial review in the federal system would
be analogous to that sanctioned by the majority opinion if
an appeal from the Comptroller's decision went directly to
the Court of Appeals and there was no opportunity to establish a record comparable to the one established in the
district court. Or conversely, our review would be more on
par with the federal system if a protesting bank was afforded the opportunity of a hearing by the Department
of Banking or the equivalent there to.8 7
A major discrepancy between judicial review under the Pennsylvania rules and that under the federal system is this absence of a
proper record. In the federal system, administrative procedural
deficiencies may be compensated or "cured" by a de novo review
under the provisions of the APA.88 Here, for the first time, facts
may be discovered and evidence taken. There is no need to rely on
facts and a record which have been developed at the administrative level. The APA provides that facts may be developed before the court prior to the final decision without having to rely
on a record which has been made up ex parte.
Compare Pennsylvania: broad certiorari includes a review of
the entire record including the testimony. But where the facts on
the record are determined ex parte-as was the case in Cement
Nat'l Bank-there is no effective opportunity for protesting banks
to know or controvert claims of the opposing side.
CONCLUSION

Cement Nat'l Bank represents an unwise departure in administrative law pertaining to branch banking in Pennsylvania. The
court strained to aid a policy which seeks to keep state branch
relevant statute is silent on the question of appellate review. (emphasis added).
Rules of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (1968).
87. 425 Pa. at 572, 230 A.2d at 219. Query, since the appeal to the
federal court issues as of right, (First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon,
352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965), can it be said that the bank's appeal by broad
certiorari, which is discretionary, is equal to the right a bank has under the
federal system?
88. See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); 'Bourjois, Inc. v.
Chapman, 301 U.S. 183 (1937). See generally, 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 9,
§ 22.04.
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banking approval procedure competitive with federal procedure.
Interpreting a legislative intent to remove a hearing requirement
in every branch bank application, the court erroneously equated its
own procedure with federal procedure.
The difficulties for the Pennsylvania court are three: (1) the
absence of a right to a de novo judicial review; (2) the ex parte
procedure by which the Department of Banking obtains the evidence on which the record is made; and, (3) the absence of a requirement that the Department make findings and assign reasons
for them. Moreover, by taking the appeal by certiorari, while
categorizing the nature of the agency determination as non-judicial
in the face of existing case law, can only lead to greater confusion in
an already confused area of Pennsylvania court procedure.
The "need" criterion for bank branch approval is a factual determination unique not only to each bank but to each banking
community. Since this criterion is the major factor to be considered in a branch approval, the evidence to establish this need
should be subjected to procedural safeguards of fairness which
requires that the opposing party know and have the opportunity
to controvert the evidence presented.
PETER F. STUART

